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CASENOTES
Merrill v. Navegar: A Soon to Be Reversed
Aberration, or a Trend Towards
Gun Manufacturer Liability?
I. INTRODUCTION
In Merrill v. Navegar,' the First District Court of Appeals of Cali-
fornia reversed summary judgment granted by the lower court in favor
of a gun manufacturer whose alleged negligent production, promotion,
and distribution of firearms increased the likelihood that criminals
would misuse weapons in the furtherance of a crime.2 After considering
the facts surrounding the tragedy that occurred at 101 California Street,
the court became the first appellate court in the United States to recog-
nize a duty on the part of a gun manufacturer.' Specifically, the court
held that a weapons manufacturer owes a duty to exercise reasonable
care to ensure that its actions in manufacturing, marketing, and distribut-
ing firearms do not create risks above those already inherent in the pres-
ence of guns in society.4 In so holding, the court reasoned that the
criminal misuse of weapons and the resulting injuries were foreseeable.
The court cited other factors, such as the manufacturer's morally blame-
worthy conduct and the public policy of preventing future harm, to jus-
tify the imposition of such a duty.5 Furthermore, the court asserted that
the imposition of this duty would not unreasonably deprive responsible
citizens of the right to purchase and use firearms.6
The tragedy at 101 California Street occurred on July 1, 1993 when
Gian Luigi Ferri entered an office building in San Francisco.7 Armed
with two TEC-DC9 semi-automatic weapons manufactured by Navegar
and a semi-automatic pistol, Ferri entered a law firm located on the
thirty-fourth floor and opened fire.' When the carnage ceased, eight
1. Merrill v. Navegar, 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d 146 (Ct. App. 1999).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 193.
4. Id. at 172.
5. Id. at 169.
6. Id. at 171-72.
7. Id. at 152.
8. Id.
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were dead, six were wounded, and Ferri had fatally shot himself.9
Ferri had begun shopping for semi-automatic weapons in early
1993.10 After making inquiries regarding a wide variety of guns includ-
ing a TEC-9 and a Glock, he purchased a new TEC-DC9 at a pawn shop
in Nevada.' He acquired his second TEC-DC9 at a gun show in
Nevada several months later.12 He obtained both guns using counterfeit
identification.' 3 Navegar had sold the first weapon to a gun distributor
in Arizona. 4 A distributor in Ohio purchased the second weapon, and
then sold it to a dealer in Utah, from whom Ferri purchased it at the gun
show.' 5 All of the distributors were licensed and all of the transactions
that culminated with Ferri acquiring the weapons were legal under appli-
cable federal and state gun control laws. 6 Since both weapons were
acquired outside of California, the Roberti-Roos Assault Weapons Con-
trol Act of 1989, which restricts the sale of assault weapons within the
state, was not applicable. 7
On June 18, 1993, just six days before the shooting at 101 Califor-
nia Street, Ferri returned to the pawn shop where he had purchased his
first weapon and made a second acquisition.1 8 He bought a Norinco
Model 1911AI semi-automatic pistol and ammunition. 9 All three
weapons were used during the shooting, and Ferri's strategy regarding
each weapon was deliberate.2 ° Once on the thirty-fourth floor of the
office building, he used the two TEC-DC9s to lay down a field of fire
that wounded his victims.2' The TEC-DC9s allowed him to create a
blanket of fire rather than shooting individual bullets one at a time.22
This blanket of fire covered a large area, decreasing the chances that any
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 152-53.
12. Id. at 153.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Under federal law, both the TEC-9 and TEC-DC9 are specifically identified as "semi-
automatic weapons." See 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(30)(A)(viii) (1995). While both federal and state
laws restrict the sale of weapons that the legislature deems to be too dangerous, the outright ban of
such weapons has not been held to be constitutional. See generally, U.S. CONST. amend. II.
17. See CAL. PENAL CODE, §§ 12275. The Roberti-Roos Assault Weapons Control Act of
1989 specifically bans the TEC-9. The TEC-DC9 is the successor model to the TEC-9 differs
only by very minor modifications. Because of these minor differences, the TEC-DC9 is, by
implication, banned by the California legislation.
18. Merrill, 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 154.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 156.
21. Id.
22. Id.
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of his intended targets could escape.23 After immobilizing his victims,
he then used the Norinco .45-caliber pistol, a much more accurate
weapon at close range, to terminate his victims in a more "direct and
personal manner. "24
The survivors of the victims of the office shooting brought suit
against the manufacturer of the weapons used in the shooting, asserting
claims under theories of negligence, negligence per se and strict liability
for ultrahazardous activities, based on the manufacturing, marketing,
and distribution of the weapons. 25 The Superior Court in San Francisco
County granted Navegar's motion for summary judgment as to all three
causes of action: common law negligence, negligence per se, and strict
liability for ultrahazardous activities. 2 6 The survivors appealed the rul-
ing as to their claims of ordinary negligence and strict liability, but not
negligence per se. Despite affirming the grant of summary judgment for
the cause of action alleging strict liability, the appellate court reversed
the grant of summary judgment for negligence.27 The court found that
Navegar owed a duty to exercise reasonable care to not create risks
above those inherent in the presence of firearms, and that there were
triable issues of fact as to whether that duty was breached.2
This Note will argue that the court erred in holding that Navegar
owed any form of duty to the general public. Until now, courts have,
without exception, resisted holding gun manufacturers liable under any
tort theory including negligence or strict liability for their legally made,
non-defective weapons. The only successful claims against gun manu-
facturers occurred either when there was a cause of action for negligence
per se where a statute limited the activities of manufacturers, or where
there was a cause of action for product liability and the weapon did not
perform as intended. 29 Any judgment against a gun manufacturer could
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 152. Lawsuits were also brought against USA Magazines, which manufactured the
32-round magazine used by Ferri in the TEC-DC9s, the Nevada pawn shop where Ferri purchased
one of the TEC-DC9s, and Hell-Fire Trigger Systems, Inc., manufacturer of a trigger activator
designed to allow more rapid operation of the firearm. Hell-Fire was removed from the case due
to its subsequent bankruptcy. The demurrers of USA Magazines were sustained. The pawn shop
settled its claims with the plaintiffs. See Bruce H. Kobayashi & Joseph E. Olson, In Re 101
California Street: A Legal and Economic Analysis of Strict Liability for the Manufacture and Sale
of "Assault Weapons," 8 STAN. L. & POL'y REV. 41, 53 n.10 (1997); see also Harriet Chiang,
Judge Drops Part of Gun Suit: Ammunition Clip Maker Not Tied to Law Firm Massacre, S.F.
CHRON., Mar. 12, 1996, at A11.
26. Merrill, 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 152.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. See Gerald M. Mackarevick, Manufacturers' Strict Liability For Injuries From a Well-
Made Handgun, 24 WM. & MARY L. REv. 467, 481-82 (1983).
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set a precedent for other states and effectively shift the battle over guns
in the United States from the legislature to the courts. 30 Accepting gun
manufacturer liability would open the floodgates to a multitude of simi-
lar suits. 3' Every victim of a gun shot wound would attempt to recover
from the "deep pockets" of the manufacturer instead of from the actual
criminal.32
Part Two of this Note will discuss the treatment of claims against
manufacturers. Part Three will analyze the Merrill court's decision.
Part Four will conclude that the Merrill court failed to exercise appropri-
ate judicial restraint in the rendering of its opinion, and that the Califor-
nia Supreme Court is likely to reverse the case when confronted with it.
PART II: PERSPECTIVE
Justice Hearle, the dissenting justice on the First District Court of
Appeals, noted that this was the first appellate court in the nation to
declare, in a negligence action, that a gun manufacturer owes a duty of
care to third parties injured by the criminal misuse of one of its weapons
by a remote purchaser.3 3 Despite the unbroken line of appellate prece-
dent in both state and federal courts that declines to impose a duty on
gun manufacturers, the Merrill court essentially created a new tort of
negligent marketing.34
In the absence of a special relationship, the manufacture, market-
ing, and distribution of a non-defective product that may legally be sold
is rarely found to-constitute negligence. In fact, the court's ruling is
completely without any supporting appellate precedent.36 Most U.S.
courts have held that traditional tort theories provide no basis for hold-
ing gun manufacturers liable.37 To date, courts have declined opportuni-
ties to impose a duty on gun manufacturers and have deferred to the
appropriate legislative body. This sentiment was even embodied by the
trial court here, when it stated that in order "the way (to change the law
as it related to the manufacture and sale of firearms) is through the Capi-
30. See David B. Kopel & Richard E. Gardner, Triggering Liability: Should Manufacturers,
Distributors, and Dealers Be Held Accountable for the Harm Caused by Guns?, 19 SETON HALL
LEGIS. J. 737, 749-50 (1995).
31. See Joi Gardner Pearson, Make It, Market It, and You May Have to Pay for It: An
Evaluation of Gun Manufacturer Liability for the Criminal Use of Uniquely Dangerous Firearms
in Light of In Re 101 California Street, 119 B.Y.U. L. REv. 131, 161 (1997).
32. See id.
33. Merrill, 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 193.
34. Id. at 199-200, 203.
35. See Kopel & Gardner, supra note 30, at 753.
36. Merrill, 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 203.
37. See id.
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tol, not the Court."38
Advocates of gun manufacturer liability claim that social policy
demands that ultimate responsibility for the injuries caused by guns
should lie with the manufacturers themselves. 39 They argue that to hold
a gun manufacturer strictly liable is economically efficient because it
imposes the external costs of guns on the manufacturer."n Gunshot vic-
tims who are not compensated by the people who caused their injuries
often become recipients of government-supported medical assistance."
In 1993, the year Ferri committed the office shootings, damages for
medical expenses and lost productivity were estimated at more than five
billion dollars.42 An additional thirteen billion dollars were attributable
to lost quality of life.43 That year, eighty percent of the 4,888 people
who suffered gunshot wounds could not pay for their medical care.'
The average cost of treating a bullet wound victim was a staggering
$23,750.45 The argument for holding gun manufacturers strictly liable is
that without it, taxpayers effectively subsidize the gun industry.46
Rather than forcing taxpayers to bear the ultimate burden, advocates
claim that society should shift these costs to the manufacturers.47
Advocates also claim that liability offers the benefit of deterrence.48
Without manufacturer liability, they contend, the cost of third-party inju-
ries is not accounted for in the price of guns.4 9 As a result, the price of
guns remains artificially low, allowing more potential consumers to
purchase guns.50 If these costs are placed on the manufacturers, advo-
cates assert, manufacturers will charge higher prices to offset this addi-
tional cost.5 Not only would this result in fewer gun purchases,52 but
38. Id. at 207.
39. See Pearson, supra note 31, at 158.
40. Id. at 158-59.
41. Id. at 159.
42. John P. McNicholas & Matthew McNicholas, Ultrahazardous Products Liability:
Providing Victims of Well-Made Firearms Ammunition to Fire Back at Gun Manufacturers, 30
Loy. L.A. L. REv. 1599, 1626 (1997).
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. See Pearson, supra note 31, at 159.
47. See Frank J. Vandall, O.K. Corral II: Policy Issues in Municipal Suits Against Gun
Manufacturers, 44 VIL. L. REV. 547, 553 (1999). Critics contend that a solution from the courts
is preferable to legislative action. Because the members of the judiciary face less political
pressure they may force their collective view for the good of society upon the public with fewer
repercussions. See Kobayashi & Olson, supra note 25, at 41.
48. See Pearson, supra note 31, at 159.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
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manufacturers would be reluctant to continue to produce the more dev-
astating weapons that cause the most injuries.53
Liability advocates claim that since gun manufacturers are immune
from civil tort liability, they continue to sell their products to the general
public without cause. 4 The manufacturer is more culpable and blame-
worthy than the victim because the manufacturer designed, marketed,
and delivered the firearm to the general consumer population." Civil
liability, advocates argue, would force weapon manufacturers to "invest
extra capital in the design, sale, and distribution processes rather than
pay large verdicts after the fact."56 Gun manufacturers that failed to take
steps to make their weapons less dangerous would bear the risk of enor-
mous monetary losses.57
Since the early 1980s, when gun murders surpassed car accidents as
the leading cause of unnatural death in New York, California, and
Texas, gun shot victims and their families have turned to the tort system
for compensation.5 8 During that time, dozens of lawsuits have been
filed against firearm manufacturers for their role in making weapons
available for criminal misuse.59 Prior to Merrill v. Navegar, none of
these lawsuits had been successful, and only one ever reached a jury.6'
That case, Halberstam v. S. W. Daniel, Inc.,6 successfully overcame sev-
eral doctrinal obstacles that had doomed previous lawsuits.62 However,
the Halberstam plaintiffs failed to present sufficient evidence to demon-
strate the alleged link between the gun industry and violent crime.63 The
judge in Halberstam issued no written opinion, which gives the case
little legal precedent.6
Throughout the years, many arguments have been made for placing
liability on gun manufacturers. Prior to attempts to impose liability on a
53. Id. at 160.
54. See id. at 159-60.
55. See McNicholas & McNicholas, supra note 42, at 1604.
56. Id. at 1604-05. Some advocates of gun manufacturer liability argue that the gun industry
has deliberately enhanced its profits by increasing the lethality of its products. Guns, when given
minimal care, do not wear out. Many have accused the gun industry of increasing the killing
power of weapons to stimulate its markets over the last two decades. See Tom Diaz, Gun Industry
Marketing of Lethality, 29 FALL BRIEF 20, 22 (1999).
57. McNicholas & McNicholas, supra note 42, at 1605.
58. Timothy D. Lytton, Halberstam v. Daniel and the Uncertain Future of Negligent
Marketing Claims Against Firearms Manufacturers, 64 BROOK. L. REv. 681 (1998).
59. Id.
60. See id.
61. Alberstam v. S.W. Daniel, Inc., No. 95 Civ. 3323 (E.D.N.Y. 1998) (pleadings and court
orders on file in clerk's office at the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York; no
written opinion).
62. Lytton, supra note 58, at 681-82 (citing No. 95 Civ. 3323).
63. Id. at 682.
64. Id. at 698.
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theory of negligence, the argument centered around strict liability.65
Proponents of placing liability on manufacturers alleged that guns were
inherently dangerous instrumentalities, whose criminal misuse was fore-
seeable.66 They argued that guns are "defective and unreasonably dan-
gerous" products by their nature and that the manufacture and
distribution of guns is an "abnormally dangerous" activity.67 The manu-
facturer knew, and could foresee, that the weapons it produced, by their
design and because the manner in which they were manufactured, sold,
and distributed, could be used to kill human beings. 68 By placing weap-
ons into the stream of commerce, manufacturers created the hazard that
their weapons could aid gun buyers in committing murder.69 The argu-
ment follows that, because of this, manufacturers, distributors, and
retailers of guns should be held strictly liable even if the product does
not malfunction or have a "defect" in the traditional tort sense.70
Nevertheless, courts have not embraced the theory of strict liability
when used against gun manufacturers. In Addison v. Williams,7 for
instance, a Louisiana appellate court ruled that the manufacture and mar-
keting of semi-automatic assault rifles and ammunition to the general
public was not an ultrahazardous activity.7 2 Therefore, gun manufactur-
ers could not be strictly liable for injuries sustained by victims due to the
criminal conduct of an unrelated third party.73 The court asserted that
assault weapons were not "unreasonably dangerous" because they were
used in the manner in which they were intended.74 Since neither Con-
gress nor the Louisiana legislature had enacted any legislation regulating
the manufacture, sale, or possession of assault rifles, the court refused to
impose a duty on the manufacturer to refrain from selling guns to those
who are lawfully entitled to possess them.75
Similarly, product liability theory has provided no basis for gun
manufacturer liability. Claims brought under this theory have alleged
that the lethal nature of firearms constituted a design defect for which
manufacturers could be held liable.76 Courts have repeatedly held that,
65. See Andrew Jay McClurg, The Tortious Marketing of Handguns: Strict Liability is Dead,
Long Live Negligence, 19 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 777, 779 (1996).
66. See Nicholas E. Calio & Donald E. Santarelli, Turning the Gun on Tort Law: Aiming at
Courts to Take Products Liability to the Limit, 14 ST. MARY'S L.J. 471, 475 (1983).
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Addison v. Williams, 546 So. 2d 220 (La. Ct. App. 2nd 1989).
72. Id. at 224.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 223.
75. Id.
76. See McNicholas & McNicholas, supra note 42, at 1627.
20001
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
in order to find liability under this theory, the gun had to have some
defect that caused it to malfunction and act in a defective manner.7 7 In
Forni v. Ferguson,78 a New York appellate court held that, absent a
statute, the only way to impose liability on gun manufacturers was if the
products were defective. Since courts have consistently refused to con-
sider guns to be inherently defective in design, the theory of product
liability provides compensation in very few instances.
While the theory of negligence per se has had some success in plac-
ing liability on gun manufacturers, it has only done so when there was a
federal or state statute that restricted the sale of firearms to a certain
class of people.79 For instance, in Hetherton v. Sears,8" the Third Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals reversed summary judgment in favor of a gun
retailer in a case where an off-duty policeman was shot and injured by a
convicted felon.8' The gun retailer sold a rifle and ammunition car-
tridges to the assailant without complying with a Delaware statute
requiring the seller to check the purchaser's identification and to keep
records of the sale along with a description of the purchaser.82
The court held that violation of this statute, intended for the safety
of the public, constituted negligence per se.83 The court noted, however,
that its holding was only possible because of the existence of the stat-
ute.84 The court was unable to find any precedent that a gun manufac-
turer or retailer is liable for the injuries caused by one of its firearms in
the hands of a purchaser merely because it sold the weapon to the crimi-
nal.85 In addition, the Third Circuit was unable to find justification for
imposing a duty on a gun manufacturer to protect the general public
against purchasers of weapons absent a federal or state statute that regu-
lates their sale.86 The court came to this conclusion because, up until
now, every jurisdiction has declined the opportunity to impose such a
duty.87
It is precisely this refusal to impose a duty upon gun manufacturers
by the courts that has prevented the theory of ordinary negligence from
imposing liability on gun manufacturers.88 Many state appellate courts
77. See Calio & Santarelli, supra note 66, at 493.
78. Fomi v. Ferguson, 232 A.D.2d 176 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996).
79. See Kopel & Gardner, supra note 30, at 763.
80. Hetherton v. Sears, 593 F.2d 526 (3rd Cir. 1979).
81. Id. at 527.
82. Id. at 528.
83. Id. at 529-30.
84. Id.
85. See id. at 531.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. See Lytton, supra note 58, at 685.
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have revisited these issues recently and have unambiguously held that
they would not impose such a duty without legislative action. For exam-
ple, in Armijo v. Ex Cam, Inc.,89 a federal district court applying New
Mexico law dismissed an action brought by a widow of a man killed by
a person using a gun manufactured and distributed by the defendants. 90
The court noted that, absent any legislative action, it would not impose a
duty upon manufacturers of firearms merely because firearms have the
potential to be misused for the purposes of crime.91
In Riordan v. International Armament Corp.,92 an Illinois appellate
court held that handgun manufacturers and distributors owed no duty to
take precautions to prevent the sale of their handguns to persons reason-
ably likely to cause harm to the general public.93 The court also held
that gun manufacturers owed no duty to provide adequate warnings to
consumers that possession of a handgun is dangerous and that posses-
sion of a concealed weapon was illegal under state and federal law.94
Gun liability advocates had hoped to use the lack of sufficient warning
to their advantage under negligence theory.95 The court reasoned that
these dangers were obvious and a manufacturer or distributor would
have no reason to expect that a reasonable consumer would not recog-
nize these dangers.96
A Washington state appellate court, in Knott v. Liberty Jewelry and
Loan,9 7 similarly declined to hold a gun manufacturer liable for failing
to warn its customers and distributors about the "dangerous propensi-
ties" of its weapons. 98 The court reasoned that even though the criminal
misuse of firearms can impose a heavy cost on society, 99 the general
public can presumably recognize the dangerous consequences of fire-
arms and can assume responsibility for their actions. 10° The court was
not willing to invade what it believed to be the province of the
legislature. 10
In Buczkowski v. McKay,10 2 the Michigan Supreme Court likewise
89. Armijo v. Ex Cam, Inc., 656 F. Supp. 771 (D.N.M. 1987).
90. Id. at 772.
91. See id. at 775.
92. Riordan v. Int'l Armament Corp., 477 N.E.2d 1293 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985).
93. Id. at 1295.
94. Id. at 1297.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Knott v. Liberty Jewelry and Loan, Inc., 748 P.2d 661, 663 (Wash. Ct. App. 1988).
98. Id. at 663.
99. Id.
100. See id. at 664.
101. Id.
102. Buczkowski v. McKay, 490 N.W.2d 330 (Mich. 1992).
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declined to impose such a duty. 10 3 The court held that a retailer of guns
had no duty to protect the general public from the unlawful use of
ammunition from a purchaser.10 4 In that case, an intoxicated customer
purchased shotgun ammunition and injured the victim. 105 The court
noted that the ammunition was neither defective nor inherently danger-
ous and that the legislature had not defined a class of purchasers which
could be deemed legally incompetent to buy ammunition.' 0 6 The court
determined that the retailer should not be burdened by a duty to foresee
a customer's criminal purpose, even where the purchaser obtaining the
ammunition is intoxicated. 107
The Arkansas Supreme Court also refused to impose such a duty in
First Commercial v. Lorcin.1°8 There, the administrator of the estate of
a victim of a fatal shooting brought a wrongful death action against the
seller and manufacturer of a handgun."°9 The court ruled that the gun
manufacturer did not have a special relationship with the victim that
would give rise to a duty." 0 The court held that no liability existed in
tort for harm resulting from the criminal acts of third parties because the
manufacturer had no control over its retailers and to whom they sold,
and there was no law that controlled weapon distribution."1 In this situ-
ation, the court was persuaded by the lack of precedent for placing lia-
bility with a gun manufacturer.' 12
In Valentine v. On Target,'13 a Maryland appellate court was
unwilling to find a gun retailer negligent when weapons were stolen and
later caused injuries. 14 The court held that a gun retailer owed no duty
to a murder victim to prevent the theft of his weapons." 5 The court
noted that the seller could not have known of the existence of circum-
stances that increased the probability that a thief would steal guns and
that an unknown third party would use one of them in a criminal man-
ner.116 The court found that the foreseeability that guns are increasingly
used in the commission of crimes was an insufficient basis upon which
103. See id. at 331.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 332.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 336.
108. First Commercial Trust Co. v. Lorcin Engineering, Inc., 900 S.W.2d 202 (Ark. 1995).
109. Id.
110. Id. at 205.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Valentine v. On Target, Inc., 727 A.2d 947 (Md. 1999).
114. Id. at 948.
115. Id. at 953.
116. Id. at 950.
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to impose liability.' 17
Until recently, under negligence theory, negligent marketing
remained unexplored as a claim against a gun manufacturer." 8 Tradi-
tionally, there have been three insurmountable obstacles to judicial rec-
ognition of a duty of care in negligent marketing claims against firearms
manufacturers. 1 9 The first obstacle was a refusal by courts to apply the
negligent entrustment doctrine to gun manufacturers who marketed their
weapons to the general public. 20 Liability based on a negligent entrust-
ment theory generally arises from selling potentially harmful products to
consumer groups that lack the capacity to exercise ordinary care.'
Courts have held that negligent entrustment applied when a product is
marketed to children or some other recognizably high-risk group, but not
to the general public.' A negligent marketing claim, relying in part on
the negligent entrustment theory, is essential if plaintiffs hope to avoid
precedents rejecting duty in ordinary negligence claims. 123 Negligent
marketing theory allows plaintiffs to argue that manufacturers owe a
duty to the general public to adopt reasonable restraints on marketing. 124
Causation is more easily established if the plaintiff can argue that the
manufacturer breached its duty by actively marketing to criminals.121 If
courts recognized this duty, a jury would be permitted to infer that par-
ticular features of gun promotion and distribution breached that duty.12 6
The second obstacle facing plaintiffs was that courts tended to view
negligent marketing claims as design defect claims in disguise. Judges
viewed these claims as identical to defect claims, which focused on the
dangerous characteristics of guns and sought to stop production of
them.127 Courts, therefore, insisted that plaintiffs allege a defective con-
dition in the weapon in order to recover.'28 The third obstacle was that
courts refused to hold defendants liable for injuries inflicted by the inter-
117. Id.
118. See Lytton, supra note 58, at 683.
119. Id.
120. Id. The author mentions that in the Restatement (Second) of Torts, section 390, negligent
entrustment is defined as one who supplies directly or through a third person a chattel for the use
of another whom the supplier knows or has reason to know to be likely because of his youth,
inexperience, or otherwise, to use it in a manner involving unreasonable risk of physical harm to
himself and others whom the supplier should expect to share in or be endangered by its use. Id. at
688.
121. Id. at 683.
122. Id. at 683-84.
123. Id. at 683.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 706.
126. Id. at 683.
127. Id. at 684.
128. Id.
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vening, intentional, criminal misconduct of third parties, in the absence
of a special custodial relationship between the defendant and the third
parties, in the absence of a special custodial relationship between the
defendant and the third party.
129
PART III: ANALYSIS
From the moment this tragedy occurred, advocates of gun manufac-
turer liability realized that this case had the potential to establish new
precedent. First, the media coverage of the senseless brutality raised
awareness of the utter devastation that weapons could cause. 3 ' Second,
the weapons involved in this tragedy were not ordinary guns. The TEC-
DC9 is a semi-automatic assault weapon based on the TEC-9, a product
made by the same manufacturer for the South African military, and now
banned in California.131 Since the TEC-9 was designed for military use,
its successor, the "TEC-DC9[,] incorporates characteristics commonly
found in military-style weapons which enhance its user's ability to
engage in extremely rapid and sustained fire.' 32
The fact that this case withstood summary judgment differentiates
it from its predecessors. The California Superior Court's decision to
allow the plaintiff's strict liability, negligence, and negligence per se
counts to survive a motion to dismiss "was a surprise to many in the
legal community."' 33  Judge Warren, speaking for the majority,
explained that this case differed from the typical gun case because the
California Assembly "carefully considered the legislative decision" to
distinguish so-called assault weapons from other firearms, in the
Roberti-Roos Assault Weapons Control Act of 1989 ("AWCA"). 134
The First District Court of Appeals correctly affirmed the lower
court's grant of summary judgment regarding the strict liability claim.
Strict liability would not have been appropriate because it is impossible
to identify a class of firearms that are used exclusively for illegal pur-
poses. Typically, assault weapons legislation, such as the AWCA, does
not target a class of firearms based on whether they are used exclusively
for illegal purposes. 135 The firearms designated as assault weapons in
the AWCA are not distinguished by their use in crime and are not differ-
ent from other functionally identical firearms. 1 36 The poorly conceived
129. Id.
130. Merrill, 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 157.
131. McNicholas & McNicholas, supra note 42, at 1600.
132. Id.
133. Kobayashi & Olson, supra note 25, at 42.
134. In re California Street, No. 959316 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed Apr. 10, 1995).
135. Kobayashi & Olson, supra note 25, at 42, 43.
136. Id.
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legislation, which passed by a single vote, prohibits weapons individu-
ally by name.' 37 The list of illegal guns has continued to change, result-
ing in an odd collection of firearms.' 38 The weapons classified by the
AWCA as "assault weapons" are not more dangerous than those not
listed. For example, the TEC-DC9 used by Ferri is functionally identi-
cal to, and fires the same ammunition as, hundreds of 9mm semi-auto-
matic pistol models not classified as "assault weapons" by the Act. 139
The firepower of Navegar's TEC-DC9 can be exceeded by any non-
assault weapon pistol with an extended ammunition clip that accepts
detachable magazines.' 40 The list of guns in the legislation is irrational
and has been described as having "been selected by persons thumbing
through a picture book of firearms, looking for ugly guns."''
Although the First District Court of Appeals rejected the theory of
strict liability, it incorrectly embraced negligence as a means of impos-
ing liability on Navegar. Unlike previous attempts to place liability on
gun manufacturers using a negligence theory, the plaintiffs in this case
focused on a claim of negligent marketing. 4 ' While the elements for
the cause of action remain the same, it is easier to establish and define a
duty in a negligent marketing claim.'43 There are four elements in an
action for negligence: (1) the existence of a duty to conform to a stan-
dard of care to protect others against unreasonable risks of harm; (2)
conduct below the standard of care which amounts to a breach of that
duty; (3) the defendant's act or omission was the cause of the plaintiff's
injuries; and (4) damages resulting from the injury." Only two of these
four elements were before the court in this case: the existence and scope
of Navegar's duty and whether Navegar's activities, caused the victim's
137. Id. at 44; see also George Lucas, Legislature OKs Ban on Assault Guns, S.F. CHRON.,
May 19, 1989, at Al.
138. In upholding California's AWCA, the Ninth Circuit held that an assault weapons ban that
specifically identifies guns by model and manufacturer was not an unconstitutional bill of
attainder. The court held that the statute caused only economic harm which "in no way amounts
to punitive confiscation." Fresno Rifle and Pistol Club, Inc. v. Van De Kamp, 956 F.2d 723 (9th
Cir. 1992).
139. Kobayashi & Olson, supra note 25, at 45.
140. Id. The most powerful pistol on the market, the Enforcer 3000, is legal under the AWCA.
The most concealable pistol, the Smith & Wesson 5906, is also legal under the AWCA. There is
nothing about the TEC-9 which makes it more dangerous than those two legal weapons. The three
guns differ only in cosmetic features and nonfunctional accessories. Id.
141. Id. at 46. The TEC-DC9 used by Ferri in the course of his crime is yet another example
of the confusion fostered by the AWCA. Although Ferri purchased his firearm in Nevada, he
could have legally purchased it in California. The AWCA only bans the TEC-9. Navegar's new
TEC-DC9, which only differs slightly from its predecessor, has not been added to the list of
prohibited firearms.
142. Merrill, 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 152.
143. See Lytton, supra note 58, at 693.
144. Merrill, 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 161.
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injuries. 14 5
Duty is the first essential element of any negligence claim. 146 Duty
is a question of whether the defendant is under any obligation to protect
the particular plaintiff. 147 The existence of duty depends on whether the
plaintiffs interests are entitled to legal protection against the defen-
dant's conduct. 141 Perhaps the largest problem in determining whether a
duty exists is that no universal test has been formulated. 14 9 A determi-
nation that the outcome was somehow foreseeable is a prerequisite to
finding a legal duty under all analyses. 5 '
The word "duty" is used throughout the Restatement (Second) of
Torts to denote the fact that the actor is required to conduct himself in a
particular manner.' 5 1 If the actor does not conduct himself in the pre-
scribed manner, he risks becoming liable for any injury sustained by
another to whom the duty is owed, of which that actor's conduct is a
legal cause. 152 Although the legal standard of duty is still evolving, an
overwhelming majority of American jurisdictions now treat duty as a
policy-based, multi-factor balancing test. 5 3 When dealing with abstract
questions of duty, most American courts have had little use for the rele-
vant sections of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.1 4 Courts disregard
the Restatement and adhere to an analysis of duty that centers around
public policy, social considerations, and other similar factors.' 55 Several
critical California Supreme Court decisions made this approach popular,
particularly Weirum v. RKO General Inc.,'56 Tarasoff v. Regents of the
University of California,157 and Rowland v. Christian.58
The Weirum court held that a radio station was liable for creating
an unreasonable risk to the public because of a contest in which listeners
145. Id.
146. McClurg, supra note 65, at 796.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. See id.
150. Id.
151. Peter F. Lake, Common Law Duty in Negligence Law: The Recent Consolidation of a
Consensus on the Expansion of the Analysis of Duty and the New Conservative Liability Limiting
Use of Policy Considerations, 34 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 1503, 1520 n.112 (1997). See generally
DAN B. DOBBS, TORTS AND COMPENSATION: PERSONAL ACCOUNTABILITY AND SOCIAL
RESPONSIBILITY FOR INJURY (2d ed. 1993); JOHN G. FLEMING, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF
TORTS (1967); W. PACE KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS (5th ed. 1984).
152. Lake, supra note 151, at 1520-1522.
153. Id. at 1523.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Weirum v. RKO General, Inc., 539 P.2d 36 (Cal. 1975).
157. Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California, 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976).
158. Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561 (Cal. 1968); see also Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912
(Cal. 1968).
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were encouraged to speed through a metropolitan area in order to locate
a disc jockey who was giving away money prizes.' 59 In deciding that
the radio station had a duty to the general public because the resulting
injuries were foreseeable, the court expanded the concept of "duty."
One year later, in Tarasoff, the court further expanded the concept
of duty. Tarasoff is one of the most celebrated tort case involving "spe-
cial relationships." The court held that a psychotherapist had a duty to
warn his patient's victim, a former girlfriend, of lethal threats against
her.16° The Tarasoff court quoted Dean Keeton, who wrote that "duty is
not sacrosanct in itself, but is only an expression of the sum total of
those considerations of policy which lead the law to say that the particu-
lar plaintiff is entitled to protection."16' Tarasoff and Weirum, as well as
Rowland, have altered the landscape of U.S. tort law by becoming the
majority rule. 162 Although the Merrill court did not cite Tarasoff, it
relied heavily on Rowland to arrive at its conclusion that Navegar owed
a duty to the general public. 163
In determining whether a duty existed, the Merrill court adopted
the rule from Rowland, which states that "each person has a duty to use
ordinary care and is liable for injuries caused by his failure to exercise
reasonable care under the circumstances.'' Whether a duty of care
exists in a given circumstance is a question of law to be determined by
the court. 65 The court's analysis began with identifying the circum-
stances under which Navegar manufactured, marketed, and made its
product available to the general public. 166 Since the risk of harm result-
ing from the criminal misuse of firearms is always present within soci-
ety, the manufacturer and distributor of a legal, non-defective firearm
may not be found negligent merely because they make and sell the
weapon. 167 However, the three distinct activities of manufacturing, mar-
keting, and distributing the weapons are interrelated. When a gun manu-
facturer implements a marketing strategy that deliberately targets a
criminal customer with a weapon that presents an unusually high risk of
harm and has no utility for legitimate purposes, fails to take reasonable
steps in the marketing process to minimize the risk that its product will
159. Weirum, 539 P.2d 36 at 46-48.
160. See Tarasoff, 551 P.2d at 243; see also Todd Waller, M.D., Estates of Morgan v. Fairfield
Family Counseling Center: Application of Traditional Tort Law Post-Tarasoff, 31 AKRON L. REV.
321 (1997).
161. Waller, supra note 160, at 325.
162. Lake, supra note 151, at 1516.
163. See Merrill, 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 161-62.
164. Id. at 161.
165. Id. at 162.
166. Id. at 161-63.
167. See Calio & Santarelli, supra note 66, at 476-77.
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be purchased by persons likely to misuse them, the likelihood of injuries
resulting from criminal misuse of the weapons increases.'68 As a result,
the Merrill court held that gun manufacturers have a duty to use due care
in order to minimize risks which exceed those already present in the sale
of firearms. 169
Upon reviewing the record, the court identified several aspects of
the manufacturing, marketing, and distribution of the TEC-DC9 that
increased the risks already associated with weapons.17 ° The TEC-DC9
is equipped with "Hell-Fire" triggers that allow it to function like an
automatic weapon.17' This aspect makes it a militaristic weapon that has
the capacity to empty its thirty-two round magazine in a matter of
seconds.' 72 In addition, it is designed to deliver the maximum amount
of firepower by storing the largest number of cartridges in a small
space. 73 It also comes with a "barrel shroud" that disperses the heat
generated by the rapid firing of ammunition, allowing the user to grasp
the barrel of the gun with both hands. '74 This facilitates spray-firing not
designed to hit any single target. The barrel of the TEC-DC9 is also
threaded, making it compatible with a silencer, a device which muffles
the sound produced by the firing of the weapon. 75 The use of such
devices is restricted by federal law.'76 The court noted that not only is
the TEC-DC9 not designed for civilian use, but it is also "completely
useless for hunting, is never used by competitive or recreational shooters
and has no legitimate sporting use."' 17 7 Due to these characteristics, the
TEC-DC9 is also not suited for self-defense and could be dangerous
when used for that purpose. 178
The TEC-9, which looks like a small machine gun, first gained
notoriety from its prominent use in the popular television series Miami
168. Merrill, 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 163-64 (citing Knight v. Jewett, 834 P.2d 696 (Cal. 1992)
(holding that defendants do not have a legal duty to eliminate risks inherent in sports such as touch
football, but do have a duty to exercise due care not to increase the risks over and above those
inherent in the sport)).
169. Id. at 164.
170. See id. at 154-55.
171. Id. The "Hell-Fire" trigger is an accessory made by another company that can also be
used in conjunction with many other weapons not manufactured by Navegar. Hell-Fire Trigger
Systems, Inc. was also initially part of the law suit but was removed due to subsequent
bankruptcy. See supra note 25.
172. Id. During the office shooting, Ferri fired one round every five seconds. See Kobayshi &
Olson, supra note 25, at 42 n.14.
173. Merrill, 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 154.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. See 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(24) (2000).
177. Merrill, 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 154.
178. Id.
[Vol. 55:123
GUN MANUFACTURER LIABILITY
Vice.' 79 For two years, it was the leading assault weapon seized by law
enforcement agencies.1 80 In 1991, it accounted for twenty-four percent
of all assault weapons seized.'' Although assault weapons account for
only one-half of one percent of the privately owned firearms in the
United States, they represent over ten percent of the guns traced to
crimes.112 Several of the weapon's characteristics make it appealing to
criminals. The TEC-DC9 is small enough to be concealed on the body
or inside a briefcase, its firepower is virtually unsurpassed, and it is sold
at a low price. 18 3
The plaintiffs alleged that Navegar understood the unique capabili-
ties that its gun possessed, and deliberately targeted the marketing of the
TEC-DC9 to certain types of people.'84 Michael Solodovnick, the sales
and marketing director for Navegar from 1989 to 1993, testified during a
deposition that he was aware of reports connecting guns to violent crime
and admitted that the target market for the TEC-DC9 was "militaristic
people."' 85  Navegar targeted these people by advertising in gun
magazines and displaying weapons at gun shows. 186 Navegar used slo-
gans that labeled the weapon "tough as your toughest customer" and
printed promotional materials that referred to the weapon as having an
"excellent resistance to fingerprints."' 87 Despite having no legitimate
civilian use, the weapon was made available to the public. According to
an expert during the trial, the availability of the military style assault
weapon "was a substantial factor in causing Ferri to undertake his
assault at 101 California."'' 88
The mere fact that Navegar built a gun with specialized capabilities
does not make it liable under negligence. Liability does not arise simply
because the weapon was not as safe as it could have been. 89  The
179. Mark Pazniokas, Gun Maker in Court Makes No Apologies, HARTFORD COURANT, Jan.
28, 1994, at B1.
180. Merrill, 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 155.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 156.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 157.
188. Id. at 158.
189. See Ted Copetas, Handguns Without Child Safety Devices-Defective in Design, 16 J.L.
& CoM. 171 (1996). This Note does not argue for or against gun safety. See generally Mark D.
Polston & Douglas S. Weil, Unsafe by Design: Using Tort Actions To Reduce Firearm-Related
Injuries, 8 STAN. LAW & POL'Y REV. 13 (1997). Another way to reduce unintentional shootings is
to hold the gun manufacturers liable under products liability for defective design. See Hurst v.
Glock, Inc., 684 A.2d 970 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996) (holding that even though a gun
presents "obvious dangers," a gun used in an unintentional shooting could be a defective product
because it did not have a device that prevented discharge when the magazine was removed). On
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weapon was also not defective simply because it was capable of being
used in conjunction with accessories made by other companies. The
functional capabilities of the TEC-DC9 that Ferri used did not provide
him with a unique opportunity to commit this particular crime. Ferri
fired one round every five seconds.190 At that rate of fire, he could have
used any firearm to carry out his crime. The self-loading characteristic
of the TEC-DC9 and its compatibility with accessories were irrelevant to
the resulting damage.
Due to the way Navegar manufactured, marketed, and distributed
the weapon, the court found that Navegar increased the risk of harm
already present in the activity of selling guns.191 In Knight v. Jewett,192
the California Supreme Court recognized a duty not to increase the risk
of harm already inherent in an activity.1 93 Although Knight concerned
the dangers present in sporting activities, the Merrill court extended this
reasoning to firearms as well. 194 Sports, like handguns, are inherently
dangerous in many ways, but are permitted to be free of the general duty
to eliminate all risks of harm because they are viewed as socially desira-
ble and useful. The court noted, however, that gun manufacturers can be
expected to refrain from actively increasing the inherent risk of danger
of their product. 95 Knight, like Tarasoff, holds that defendants gener-
ally owe no duty to minimize the risks inherent in any activity unless
they are in a "special relationship" with the plaintiff.196 Although Nave-
gar was not in a "special relationship" with the general public, the court
explained that this general principle has no application where the defen-
dant actively undermined the plaintiffs position and created a foresee-
able risk of harm to third persons.1 97 Navegar produced its weapons for
fantasy and not criminal use, but the court reasoned that the way the gun
March 17, 2000, Smith & Wesson reached a settlement that removes it from suits alleging that
defects in design caused unintentional shootings. Faced with suits from more than twenty-five
cities and counties, the gun manufacturer announced a twenty-one page agreement that includes
several initiatives designed to make guns less subject to misuse. Some provisions include: a
promise to devote two percent of revenue to smart technology that would allow only owners to
fire their guns; locking devices to keep children from firing the weapons; and guns that only fire
from clips of ten or fewer rounds. See Richmond Eustis, Gunmakers Study Smith & Wesson's
Settlement, FULTON COUNTY DAILY REP., Mar. 21, 2000, at 1. Whether the legislature or the
judiciary decides to force gun manufacturers to make their weapons safer is irrelevant to whether a
gun manufacturer owes a duty to the general public to protect against misuse by a third party
criminal.
190. Kobayashi & Olson, supra note 25, at 54 n.14.
191. Merrill, 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 163.
192. Knight v. Jewett, 834 P.2d 696 (Cal. 1992).
193. Merrill, 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 163-64 (citing Knight, 834 P.2d at 696).
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 164-65.
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was manufactured and marketed enticed criminals, thereby making it an
attractive nuisance. 198
In both Tarasoff and Rowland, the California Supreme Court enun-
ciated several factors to consider in determining the existence of a
duty.199 The factors are: (1) the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff;
(2) the closeness of the connection between the defendant's conduct and
the injury suffered; (3) the moral blame attached to the defendant's con-
duct; and (4) the policy of preventing future harm. 200 The Merrill court
found these factors to be the foundation of their determination that
Navegar owed a duty.2° '
The court rejected Navegar's contention that Ferri's rampage could
not have been foreseen because it did not involve the ordinary use of its
product.20 2 Although Ferri's act was not specifically foreseeable, the
court noted that its task in determining duty was to evaluate whether the
category of negligent conduct was "sufficiently likely" to result in harm
so liability could be appropriately imposed on the negligent party.
20 3
The evidence showed that Navegar was aware of reports showing how
the TEC-DC9's combined characteristics of high firepower, low price,
and concealability made it very desirable to criminals. 2°4 The evidence
also suggested that the favored status and frequent criminal use of the
weapon was, in part, enhanced by Navegar's advertising campaign,
198. Id. at 165. Under the attractive nuisance doctrine, an owner or occupier of land is liable
to trespassing children for injury caused by conditions or objects on the premises, if the occupier
knew, or should have known, that the condition or object was in a place where children are likely
to trespass, and the occupier failed to exercise reasonable care to protect against the injury. See
generally David A. Gurwin, The Restatement's Attractive Nuisance Doctrine: An Attractive
Alternative for Ohio, 46 OHIo ST. L.J. 135, 138 (1985); Michael A. Ross. The Duty Owed to
Children: Application of Attractive Nuisance Concepts in Products Liability Actions for Failure to
Childproof, 68 U. DEr. L. REv. 537 (1991). The attractive nuisance doctrine hinges on the
concept of enticement. See United Zinc & Chemical Co. v. Britt, 258 U.S. 268 (1922) (holding
that the company was liable for exposing something dangerous that is certain to attract children
because they are of an age when "they follow bait as mechanically as fish"); Baltimore Gas &
Electric v. Lane, 653 A.2d 307 (Md. 1995) (considering whether a utility company could be held
liable for a child's injuries, caused by an empty cable spool left by the utility company near a
residential area and moved onto a playground by neighborhood children). It could be argued that
gun manufacturers similarly lure criminals to misuse their weapons in the way that they market
their guns. This, in essence, is what the First District Court of Appeals is reasoning in Merrill
when it refers to the claim of "negligent marketing."
199. Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561, at 564 (Cal. 1968).
200. Id.
201. Merrill, 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 165.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 166. Once again, the court's reasoning is flawed. The court cites the combination
of firepower and concealability as the characteristic that makes it more desirable to criminals. The
lower court rested this assumption on California legislation, the AWCA of 1989. As previously
noted, however, the most powerful and conceals pistol are legal under the AWCA. Lytton, supra
note 58, at 69.
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which called attention to its militaristic features. 2 5 The court concluded
that although not specifically foreseeable, Ferri's criminal acts were suf-
ficiently likely to happen.2 °6
Although the majority gave great weight to the foreseeability of the
events, foreseeability alone is not sufficient to create an independent tort
duty.20 7 The court, however, found that the imposition of a duty was also
justified by the other factors, described in Rowland.2°8 The court stated
that marketing the, weapon to get the attention of violent people likely to
use it for a criminal purpose, in order to increase sales of the product,
was morally blameworthy conduct.20 9 Imposing a duty was also neces-
sary, according to the court, in an effort to prevent future harm.2"0
Death and injuries result from the misuse of firearms. The court rea-
soned that if gun manufacturers were held liable in this case, the indus-
try would be forced to manufacture, market, and distribute weapons in
ways that did not increase the risks posed by the weapons.2
The court emphasized that the imposition of a duty was not a state-
ment condemning the manufacture of assault weapons.2 12 The court
clarified that the interest of the consumer in unrestricted access to a par-
ticular weapon, and the freedom of the manufacturer of that weapon to
target the marketing of its product to persons likely to criminally misuse
it, does not transcend society's interest in protecting persons exposed to
this increased risk of harm.2 13 The court also viewed the 1989 assault
weapon ban as a sign that the California legislature had already made the
policy decision that the risks of assault weapons like the TEC-DC9 out-
weighed their utility.2 14
Additionally, the appellate court reversed the trial court's grant of
summary judgment on the issue of whether Navegar's breach of duty
was the actual cause, or cause in fact, of the victims' injuries. 215 Nave-
gar argued that even if there had been a duty to exercise care, Navegar
could not be found liable because there was no evidence that its conduct
was the actual cause of the injuries suffered by the victims. 2 16 Since
there was no way to be certain whether Ferri was ever exposed to any
205. Merrill, 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 166.
206. Id. at 165.
207. Id. at 199-20.
208. Id. at 170.
209. Id. at 169.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 172.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 179.
214. Id. at 167. See also Pearson, supra note 31, at 135-36.
215. Merrill, 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 189.
216. Id. at 185.
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kinds of advertisements, Navegar's conduct and Ferri's criminal acts
may have been entirely unrelated. 217 The court rejected this argument,
holding that Navegar's conduct was a substantial factor in bringing
about the injuries.218 Frequently, events may have multiple causes and
the defendant's negligent act need not be the sole cause of injury. Even
where the injuries are inflicted by the criminal or negligent acts of a
third person, the defendant's conduct may still constitute a contributing
cause. Because several periodicals in which Navegar advertised were
found in Ferri's room, and many other forms of advertisement, such as
promotions at gun shows and the TEC-9s Navegar loaned for use in
numerous movies and television programs, were likely to have been
noticed by Ferri, the court believed that there was at least triable a issue
as to whether the slaughter at 101 California Street would have occurred
had Navegar not been negligent.2 19
Previously, California courts have been reluctant to find a duty in
cases where there have been intervening acts out of the control of the
defendants. In Avis v. Superior Court,22 ° the court found no duty on the
part of a car rental agency to control the conduct of a thief who stole a
car and subsequently injured another motorist.221 Even though the prac-
tice of leaving cars with the keys in the ignition increased the chances of
theft, the court concluded that the actual theft was an intervening act.222
The Merrill court declined to adopt the Avis holding as a blanket rule
that an intervening criminal act is, by its very nature, a superseding
cause that imposes no duty on the defendant.223 Instead, the court
adopted the Restatement view that "if the realizable likelihood that a
third person may act in a particular manner is the hazard or one of the
hazards which makes the actor negligent, such an act, whether innocent,
negligent, intentionally tortious or criminal, does not prevent the actor
from being liable for harm caused. 224
Similarly, in Casillas v. Auto-Ordinance Corp., a California federal
court affirmed a motion for summary judgment in favor of a gun manu-
facturer where one of its semi-automatic pistols was used to shoot and
217. Id. at 186.
218. Id. at 186-87. There are many ways to approach the determination of causation. While
alternate approaches have not been adopted by the courts, they still receive some support in the
academic field. See generally Richard A. Epstein, Causation in Context: An Afterward, 63 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 653 (1987).
219. Merrill, 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 189.
220. Avis Rent A Car System, Inc. v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d 711 (Ct. App. 1st 1993).
221. Id. at 719.
222. Id.
223. Merrill, 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 168-69.
224. Id. at 169 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 449 (1977)).
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seriously injure four members of a family.22 5 The court there noted that
California law does not impose a duty on gun manufacturers to insure
against third party misuse of their non-defective products.22 6 The court
reiterated that California statutes and caselaw make it likely that "the
California Supreme Court would not allow a claim against a firearm
manufacturer for damages caused by a third party's illegal use of a legal
and non-defective firearm" under a negligence theory.2 27
While the California Supreme Court has done much to expand the
definition of "duty" in landmark decisions such as Weirum, Tarasoff,
and Rowland, it is still unlikely to affirm the Merrill decision. In Rich-
ards v. Stanley,22 8 the California Supreme Court has previously refused
to create a duty when the injuries of a victim are the result of a third
party criminal. 2 29 The court held that in the absence of a special rela-
tionship between the parties, there is no duty to control conduct of a
third person so as to prevent him from causing harm to another.23 °
There, the defendant had left her car unlocked, unattended, and with the
keys in the ignition. 231 The car was subsequently stolen by a thief who
recklessly caused an accident with a motorcycle, injuring the plaintiff.232
The court ruled that while the defendant did have a duty to exercise
reasonable care in the management of her automobile, this did not
encompass a duty to protect the plaintiff from the negligent driving of a
thief.233 Therefore, it is unlikely that the California Supreme Court
would affirm the Merrill decision, which essentially imposes a duty on
gun manufacturers to protect the general public against potential
criminals who purchase the weapons from unrelated gun retailers.
The California Supreme Court is likely to have several problems
with the appellate court's holding. The duty imposed by the Merrill
court is too broad. The court will face the problem of where to draw the
line when considering which weapons are covered by this newly-created
duty. As Justice Hearle posited in his dissent, does the duty apply just to
TEC-DC9s? The majority mentioned that part of its reasoning was
based on the TEC-DC9's unique capabilities regarding firepower,
ammunition, and compatibility with other enhancing devices. If the
characteristics of the TEC-DC9 are unique, does the duty extend to other
225. Casillas v. Auto-Ordnance Corp., No. C 95-3601 FMS, 1996 U.S. Dist. WL 276830, at *6
(N.D. Cal. May 17, 1996).
226. Id. at *27.
227. Id. at *4.
228. Richards v. Stanley, 271 P.2d 23 (Cal. 1954).
229. Id.
230. Id. at 27.
231. Id. at 24.
232. Id. at 25.
233. Id. at 29.
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guns? Does the duty extend only to assault weapons? Given the previ-
ous difficulties that legislatures have had in defining the term "assault
weapon," how would courts attempt to do this? Would it include the
Norinco .45 with which Ferri killed and wounded six of the fourteen
victims? What about the Glock 9mm which Ferri carefully considered
before he purchased the TEC-DC9? Regardless of the First District
Court of Appeals' assertion, the TEC-DC9 is not unique in its capabili-
ties. Given similar circumstances, a plethora of other weapons could
have been used in the same crime.
Since Ferri shopped for weapons for over six months, it is clear that
he was going to purchase a gun to commit his planned carnage.23 4 One
can infer that he did not act because he had two TEC-DC9s as opposed
to some other model of weapon. Additionally, it appears that neither the
identity of the gun nor the gun manufacturer was critical to him. As
noted by the dissenting justice, "the responsibility for tortious acts
should lie with the individual who commits those acts. 235 We should
be reluctant to allow understandable bitterness regarding the losses
inflicted on innocent people to divert attention from where responsibility
actually lies. Sympathy for the victim of an intentional shooting is
understandable. This sympathy, however, cannot be the foundation for
the imposition of civil liability where none is provided by the existing
law. Civil liability must be based upon legal principle, not emotions.
No principle of existing tort law warrants the transfer of liability from a
criminal actor to the manufacturer or seller of the device used to inflict
harm on the victim.236 By creating a duty in these situations and
allowing this and other similar cases in the future to go before a jury, the
court ensures that the emotion regarding loss of life will force the wrong
party to suffer the consequences.
PART IV: CONCLUSION
In other analogous situations, similar liability issues have been
resolved against manufacturers and merchants. For example, the sale of
alcohol to visibly intoxicated persons will create liability on the part of
the server.237 These situations, however, were resolved by legislatures,
not the courts. Claims against retailers and manufacturers for a cus-
tomer's criminal misuse of a firearm have been recognized where the
seller violated a state or federal statute.238 In those cases, the particular
234. Merrill, 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 152-53.
235. Id. at 214.
236. Cailo & Santarelli, supra note 66, at 507-08.
237. See Hetherton, 593 F.2d 526, 531 (3rd Cir. 1979).
238. See id.
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statute identified a class of people incompetent either to purchase or to
possess weapons. 239 Beyond the class defined by the particular statute,
courts have overwhelmingly held that there is no duty owed to the public
to foresee the criminal acts of others.24°
In Merrill v. Navegar, the court has clearly invaded the province of
the legislature. This is not a situation where the court is merely shifting
other tort concepts over to guns. The sale of firearms is a legal activity.
To hold that gun manufacturers owe an indefinite duty to the general
public is to, in effect, regulate the manufacturers. Regulation, in any
form, is within the province of the legislature, not the courts. "Legisla-
tors are better equipped because they are not driven by the facts of one
case, but overall policy implications. 241 Whether the manufacture, sale,
or possession of assault rifles or any other type of gun should be banned
or otherwise restricted is an issue best be decided by the legislative
branch of government-either Congress or the state legislature. The
First District Court of Appeals of California improperly failed to adhere
to the principles of judicial restraint that have led so many previous
courts to hold that when a gun manufacturer legally produces weapons
that are free from defects, it owes no duty to protect the general public
from the perverse misuse of its weapons by a criminal.
RENE Ruiz
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